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1 Introduction
Charitable fund-raising is a highly professional activity. The Association for Professional
Fundraisers (AFP) represents 30,000 members, and Every year more than 115000 nonprot
organizations consult these professionals for a total of 2 billion dollars (Kelly, 1998). As
with many services and manufacturing sectors such as military aircraft, software, pizza
industry, it is strongly believed that fund-raising is learned on the job.1 Hence demand
for those more experienced professionals rises. For instance, a recent survey by Cygnus
Applied Research reveals that most succesful fund-raisers remain on the job for three to
six months before being recruited for another.2 As the president of Cygnus puts it: Only
one out of three fund-raisers experiences even a day without a job. Professional fund-
raisers also place a great value on experience as suggested by a fund-raisers quote: Fund
Development Associates is the regional expert in fund-raising. No one has more direct,
hands-on experience. By selecting our rm, you will have a team of professionals with more
than one hundred years of combined successful fund-raising experience who have assisted
hundreds of charitable organizations achieve their goals.3
Both practitioners and researchers agree that one of the most important fund-raising
techniques is to directly ask people (Andreoni and Payne 2003; Yoruk 2009; Meer and
Rosen 2011). It is believed that people often have good intentions to give, but unless
solicited, these intentions may not materialize. In this paper, we contend that such direct
solicitations are also the source of learning for the fund-raiser. She learns from experience
to become a more productive solicitor. For example, consider a situation in which phone
call duration of informing a potential donor shortens with each additional solicitation. The
presence of learning economies may rationalize why during big fund-drives charities solicit
some initial donors despite their donations being not su¢ cient to cover their costs, even
without considering setup costs. It may also explain the emergence of soft contribution and
time targets in fund-drives. Once we take into account the interactions between fund-raising
techonology and donor preferences, our model predicts that learning economies are worth
more in sectors where there is strong warm glow, since the fund-raisers may extensively
exploit it.
1See Argote and Epple 1990, Spence 1981, Benkard (2000).
2The survey includes 1,700 fund-raisers and 8,000 nonprot chief executives. Results are available at
http://www.cygresearch.com/les/AFP_Intl-Conf_Vancouver_April_2_2012-PenelopeBurk.pdf
3See http://www.funddevelopmentassociates.com/associates.html
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My formal setup adds an activefund-raiser to the standardmodel of giving in which
donors consume two goods: a private and a public good.4 We consider a charity that occa-
sionally runs fund-drives. The fund-raisers role consists in individually informing potential
donors about the charitable cause. Asking people is, however, costly. We introduce a fund-
raising technology with two components: a constant marginal cost measuring minimum
expenses per solicitation, and a variable part decreasing in the number of solicitations. The
latter captures learning by fund-raising. I investigate how learning shapes the fund-raising
strategy. This work also develops an appropriate notion of excessive fund-raising in a single
charity framework examining whether learning by fund-raising is a source of it.
In a setup where donors have homogeneous preferences, the charity contacts individuals
according to income, starting with the wealthiest. A su¢ cient condition to solicit one extra
individual is that she is expected to provide a gift above the marginal cost, i.e. become
a "marginal net contributor". We show that identifying these marginal net contributors
in our model is equivalent to identifying the net contributors in a model with constant
marginal cost when each donors wealth is reduced by the variable part of its marginal cost.
This important equivalence allows us to partially utilize the charaterization in Name-Correa
and Yildirim (2013) who assume away learning. In this work, the charity ranks individual
according to income and starts soliciting with the richest donor. Once some donors are in
the game, the propensity of an additional individual to net contribute decreases due to
the free-riding incentive. This e¤ect is measured in terms of the cumulative sumation of
each income di¤erence between the additional donor and the wealthier ones. Sequentially
applied, this logic implies that once the charity identies a net free-rider, the solicitations
optimally stops.
In the presence of learning, however, the fund-raiser may solicit a marginal net free-
rider, as long as this solicitation enables her to substantially move down her learning curve.
Thus, negative net contributions represent the fund-raisers investment in learning. We
provide the exact equilibrium condition of whether investing in learning is worthy or not in
section 3. The charity´s optimal stopping rule must be forward-looking. It must also take
into account the intensity of contributions for a subset of remaining individuals. While we
assume that the solicitation set is observed by the contacted donors, our characterization
is robust to unobservability under reasonable (o¤-equilibrium) beliefs.
We rst build a benchmark in which the fund-raiser establishes for each donor a min-
4See, e.g., Warr (1983); Roberts (1984); Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986); and Andreoni (1988).
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imum gift size and commits to it. We show that this commitment allows the charity to
obtain extra-large gifts from the wealthiest donors. With respect to this benchmark, we
nd that the charity conducts excessive fund-raising even with a constant return to scale so-
licitation technology. Besides lack of commitment, we show that learning is another source
of excessive fund-raising. We nd, however, that a higher learning rate may reduce both,
the extent of excessive fund-raising and the accumulated experience.
It is well known that watchdog groups evaluate a charitys e¢ ciency according to its
cost structure. They recommend managing a low xed cost. According to Charity Navi-
gator, administrative costs should not represent more than 20% of total costs. Our model
also applies to a situation in which the presence of a xed cost generates returns to scale in
fund-raising. When a higher setup cost does not totally discourage fund-raising, it increases
donations and encourages the charity to solicit more. Despite these two positive e¤ects, the
public good provision diminishes. We also show that if the solicitation technology is endo-
geneous, it may be protable for the charity to inccur a high setup cost in exchange for a
lower marginal cost when optimal fund-raising entails running big fund-drives. As an exam-
ple consider relatively homogeneous donor income distribution and/or popular charitable
causes. However, measures of e¢ ciency such as cost to donation ratios may severely under-
estimate the e¢ ciency of a fund-raising campaign at an interim stage. For big fund-drives
taking place over several years, this may be detrimental success. As a consequence, charities
may be suboptimally putting less weight on overhead costs to avoid negative advertising at
the intial stages.
We, further extend the model to incorporate a warm-glow motive for giving (Andreoni
1989) and show that our results follow under such added realism. In another extension, we
show that when the fund-raiser separates the population in groups and learning is group
specic, the charity may favor contacting groups with lower expected income and higher
potential for learning. Finally, we show that under decreasing returns to scale it is never
optimal to contact a net free-rider.
In addition to the papers mentioned above, our work ts with a small body of theo-
retical literature on strategic fund-raising as means of: advertising and reducing donors
search costs (Rose Ackerman 1983; and Andreoni and Payne 2003), providing prestige to
donors (Glazer and Konrad 1996; Harbaugh 1998; and Romano and Yildirim 2001), sig-
naling the project quality (Vesterlund 2003; and Andreoni 2006b), and organizing lotteries
(Morgan 2000). Our work is also related to the models of strategic fund-raising to overcome
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zero-contribution equilibrium under non-convex production either by securing seed money
(Andreoni 1998) or by collecting donations in piece-meals (Marx and Matthews 2000).
None of these papers, however, consider endogenous, costly solicitations and learning by
fund-raising. Other models consider learning about the project quality by providing the
charitable good within a dynamic framework. In these models learning is faster when the
cumulative production of the good is larger (Bolton and Harris 1999; and Yildirim 2003).
The closest work to ours is Name-Correa and Yildirim (2013); henceforth, NY (2013).
They build a model in which donors do not consider giving unless asked by the fund-raiser.
They fully incorporate fund-raising costs to determine the fund-raisers solicitation strategy.
The charity commits to that strategy and sucessfully launches a fund-drive. Our work is
similar to theirs; instead of attaching a cost to each donor, though, we explicitly introduce
a fund-raising cost structure unrelated to donorsidentities. This allows us to model the
learning aspect of soliciting as decreasing marginal costs in fund-raising.
Rose-Ackerman (1982) is the rst to build a model of costly fund-raising in which donors,
as in mine, are unaware of a charity until they receive a solicitation letter. She, however, does
not construct donorsresponses from an equilibrium play. She is also the rst in positing
that fund-raising is likely to be conducted in excess. Her argument is that competition
among charities triggers high expenses in fund-raising without bringing further benets to
donors. This happens whenever fund-raising diverts funds from one charity that donors
value to another they like the same. In contrast, in our model we build the concept of
excessive fund-raising in a non-competitive framework. The term "excessive" comes from
the fact that relatively more cost is incurred when charity lacks commitment to secure a
minimum level of contribution from each donor.
There exists more extensive empirical and experimental literature in charitable giving.
Andreoni (2006a) and List (2011) provide a good overview of this.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the model is presented. In Section 3,
we determine the optimal fund-raising strategy. In Section 4 we introduce returns to scale
generated by a xed cost. In Section 5 we consider excessive fund-raising. We show how
cumulative experience is a¤ected by the rate of learning in section 6. The extensions are
presented in Section 7, and conclusion in Section 8.
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2 Model
Our formal setup introduces a fund-raising technology into the the standard model of pri-
vately provided public goods (e.g., Warr 1983; Roberts 1984; Bergstrom et al. 1986; and
Andreoni 1988).For this reason we briey review this basic framework before introducing
fund-raising costs.
Standard Model. There is a set of individuals, N = f1; :::; ng, who each allocates
his wealth, wi > 0, between a private good consumption, xi  0, and a gift to the public
good or charity, gi  0. Units are normalized so that xi + gi = wi. At the outset, every
person is fully aware of the charitable fund-drive and is in the contribution game. Letting
G =
P
i2N gi be the supply of the public good, individual is preference is represented by
the utility function u(xi; G), which is strictly increasing, strictly quasi-concave, and twice
di¤erentiable. Given contribution by others, G i; consider individual is maximization
problem:
max
xi;gi
U(xi; G)
s.t. xi +G = wi +G i
G  G i
Let f(w), individual is demand for the public good ignoring the inequality constraint
above, where w = wi+G i . We assume that f(w) satises strict normality, i.e. 0 < f 0i(w) 
 < 1 for some parameter .5 . If individual i contributes, then gi = f(wi+G i) G i > 0:
We assume fi(0) = 0 which, coupled with the strict normality assumption, guarantees that
each individuals stand-alone value is positive.
Learning by Fund-raising. As in Rose-Ackerman (1982) and Andreoni and Payne
(2003), we assume that each person i becomes informed of the fund-drive only if solicited
by the fund-raiser.6 We assume for simplicity that each solicitation reaches the donor with
certainty. It costs c(i) = c + s(i) to solicit the ith individual in a sequence. The xed
marginal cost c > 0 reects minimum expenses in telemarketing, face to face solicitations,
envelopes procurement, and mailing costs. The variable marginal cost s(i) is non increasing
5The existence of parameter  facilitates our analysis by ensuring a nite G0i below. It is also commonly
assumed in the literature (e.g., Andreoni 1988; Fries, Golding, and Romano 1991).
6We envision a charity that occasionally runs fund-drives. In this scenario, it is reasonable to think that
donors are unaware of the charitable good provision.
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assume that when two distinct fund-raiser sets yield the same public good provision, the
charity selects the one with the lower cost.10
Our fund-raising game, then, proceeds as follows. First, the charity decides whether
or not to launch a fund-drive. If one is launched, the charity reaches out to the (optimal)
set F o of potential donors, who become aware of both, the fund-drive, and the others
solicited. Finally, they contribute sinultaneously to the public good, leading to equilibrium
gifts fgi (F o)gi2F o and public good G

(F o). Our solution concept is subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies.
3 Optimal fund-raising
In section 3.1 we fully characterize the fund-raising equilibrium in terms of the primitives of
the model. In section 3.2 we show that this equilibrium is robust to incomplete information.
3.1 Characterization
In order to characterize the optimal fund-raising strategy, for any set of solicitations we
observe the following: (1) The incurred cost just depends on the number of solicitations
and (2) the higher the income of an individual, the more she gives in any contribution game
F . 11. Without loss of generality, we index subjects in a descending order of their wealth:
w1  w2  :::  wn. From these two facts it is intuitive that:
Observation 1. For any optimal fund-drive size k , the top k individuals are the ones
being solicited.
This observation says that the problem of identifying the optimal fund-raising set is
linear instead of being combinatiorial. Thus, it is not necessary to compare the outcomes
of 2N potential contribution games. Instead, the charity sequentially solicits individuals
according to their incomes up to individual k such that the following inequality is satised:
F o =
n
i  k :Pik [gi (f1; 2; ::; kg)  c(i)] >Pij [gi (f1; 2; ::; jg)  c(i)] for any j 6= ko :
Consequently, optimal fund-raising attachs c(i) to individual i. In other words, from
charitys standpoint, marginal fund-raising costs are identity dependent. The fundraisers
10One justication for this could be that the charity is concerned about its cost/donation rating by the
watchdog groups.
11This is shown in Andreoni (1988)
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problem consists then in nding a stopping rule to solicitations given homogenous pref-
erences and individuals incomes and costs. Without introducing more structure to this
problem the optimal solution entails the comparison of n sets. We will show below an al-
gorithm that requires less steps to reach the optimal solution. The characterization of the
fund-raiser set resulting from the iterative application of the algorithm identies an invest-
ment in learning motive. Besides, it facilitates us to determine the e¤ects of experience on
optimal fund-raising.
According to NY (2013), when costs are purely identity dependent, the fund-raiser
designs a strategy where each individual donor i is solicited if her gift exceeds her solicitation
cost in the contribution game F = f1; 2; ::; ig; such donor is a marginal net contributor. In
that work, this marginal strategy leads to an optimal set, F o; where every solicited individual
ends up being a net contributor as well. For this reason they do not distinguish between a
net contributor and a marginal net contributor. Example 1 illustrates optimal fund-raising
without learning, as in that work.
Example 1. No learning. Let N = f1; 2; 3g and ui = x1 i (G), with  = 0:3.
Individuals wealth and solicitation costs are such that (w1; w2; w3) = (20; 14; 14),
c = 1.
Consider no scale economies, i.e., s(i) = 0. The following table reports donor equilib-
rium, and highlights the optimal fund-raiser set.
F g1   c g2   c g3   c G   C
f1g 5 :7 5 :7
f1; 2g 5:82  0:177 5:65
f1; 2; 3g 5:875  0:125  0:125 5:62
Table 1:Donor equilibrium without learning.
Tables 1 reveals that it is optimal to contact only donor 1. Donor 2 and 3 are not
included in the set because their contributions never exceed the marginal cost .
Once we introduce learning economies, it is possible that the fund-raiser at the margin
optimally solicits an individual i;who provides a gift below the cost c(i); such a donor is a
marginal net free rider. By the same token, it is also possible that a solicited marginal net
contributor ends up becoming a net free rider in the contribution game F o. Both situations
entail an investment in learning motive. We rst illustrate the former point in example 2,
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which also motivates our subsequent analysis. Once we characterize optimal fund-raising
we show the latter point in example 3.
Example 2. Investing in learning. As in the previous example, let N = f1; 2; 3g and
ui = x
1 
i (G)
, with  = 0:3. Individualswealth and solicitation costs are such that
(w1; w2; w3) = (20; 14; 14), c = 1.
Consider learning by fund-raising such that s(i) = (7; 5; 1): The following table reports
donor equilibrium, and highlights the optimal fund-raiser set.
F g1   c(1) g2   c(2) g3   c(3) G   C
f1g 3:9 3:9
f1; 2g 3:94  0:06 3:88
f1; 2; 3g 2:79  1:21 2:79 4:37
Table 2: Donor equilibrium with learning economies
Table 2 shows that it is optimal to contact donors 1,2, and 3. Without donor 3, donor
2, whose gift remains below c(2); diminishes the charitable good provision. By additionally
soliciting individual 3, however, the public good reaches its optimal level. Finally, it is clear
that even with three donors, a direct approach to identify the extent of fund-raising is non
trivial.
To develop a simple, intuitive characterization of the fund-raiser set in terms of cost
cuto¤s, we reformulate our original problem with learning economies to a constant return
to scale setting with marginal cost c and nominal income distributionf bwig. bwi = wi   s(i)
can be understood as well as individual i0s "disposable income". Under this interpretation,
sequential costs are equivalent to taxes on individuals and, for a given set F; individual is
gift is gi(F ) s(i):We show the equivalence of these two frameworks in two steps. Consider
person is maximization problem:
max
xi;gi
U(xi; G 
P
j2F
c(j))
s.t. xi + gi = wi
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As a rst step, consider substituting for wi  wi  s(i)  c and gi  gi  s(i)  c, person
i can be deemed as choosing the level of the charitable good:
max
xi;G
U(xi; G)
s.t. xi +G = wi +G i
G  G i
The solution to this maximization yields is demand function for the charitable good
given net contributions by others,G i :
G = maxff(wi +G i); G ig:
As a second step, from this whole normalization, we dene bwi  wi + c  wi   s(i) andbgi  gi + c  gi   s(i):
Let Fi be the set of the top i individuals: The next Lemma shows that individual i0s
incentive to provide a donation above the marginal cost, c, in Fi can be represented by a
cost cuto¤.
Lemma 1 Let (G)  (G) G, where  = f 1; and donor is cost cuto¤ be given by
ci = bwi   (Pij=1( bwj   bwi)): (1)
Individual i is a net contributor in Fi or marginal net contributor i¤ c < ci
By strict normality 
0
(:) > 0. Therefore, individual i s cuto¤ cost decreases in others
disposable incomes and increases in her own.
Observation 2. Absent the sequential component of fund-raising costs,i.e, c(i) = c we
obtain: c1  c2  ::  cn and F 0 = fi 2 N j c < cig (NY, 2013)
Note rst that without sequential cost, bwi = wi. Hence, for any subeconomy Fi; individ-
uals ended up being ranked by the fund-raiser according to their net gifts gi (Fi)  c; since
w1   c  w2   c::  wn   c: It is clear that ci is less than wi; except for the rst individual,
and it diminishes in i: Intuitively, once the richest donor is solicited, the second individual
is less propense to cover the marginal cost c as a consequence of the free rider problem. In
general, as the charity keeps fund-raising, free riding becomes more and more severe and
11
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Re-consider Example 1 above, under learning economies. From eq. (1), it folows that
c1 = 13; c2 =  0:33 < c < c3 = 22:33. Moreover, c3(a bw(2; 3)) = 6:33 > c: Thus, according
to Proposition 2, F o = f1; 2; 3g :The investment in learning is c(2)  g2(f1; 2; 3g) = 1:21:
Even if every solicited individual is a marginal net contributor, optimal fund-raising
may entail investing in learning as illustrated in the next example.
Example 3. (NY 2013). There are n identical individuals. Learning is drastic, i.e.
the sequence of cost is strictly decreasing c(1) > c(2) > ::: > c(n): Suppose c(1) is
small enough such that each individual solo decision would be to provide a donation.
Then, from 1 it easy follows that c < c1 < c2:: < cn: Indeed, every individual is
a marginal net contributor. However, when the set of donors is large enough, each
individual donation is close to the average cost which is clearly lower than the initial
cost c(1): Thus, some initial donors are net free riders which constitutes an investment
in learning.
To conclude this section, note that the fund-raiser considers the set resulting from
iteratively applying proposition 2 as a candidate equilibrium strategy. This set will be
optimal if, given the total fund-raising cost,
PjF oj
j=1 c(j), incurred, and contribution by others
G i; each solicited individual decides to contribute rather than consume only the private
good.
Consequently, the solicitation set derived from Proposition 2 is the equilibrium action by
the fund-raiser if each contacted individuals net cost,
PjF oj
j=1 c(j) G i, is strictly less than
her cuto¤, bCi. The next condition guarantees that this happens for every donor included
in the set.
Assumption S. Let k 2 N be the largest index such that c < ci . Then it follows that
(i)
Pk
i=1(wi   c(i)) > 0, and (ii) for i  k: f(wi   bCi)   1k (Pki=1(wi   c(i)); where
k(G) 
Pk
j=1 (G) +G:
The intuition behind assumption S is the following: Consider a solo economy. Pick any
donor i in the fund-raiser set. At C = bCi; she is indi¤erent between providing the public
good at level f(wi  bCi) or consuming exclusively the private good. Assumption S says that
whenever aggregate wealth in F o is high enough, each solicited donor is actually demanding
more than f(wi   bCi). Given strict normality, it indicates that she has strict incentives to
contribute.
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The next section shows that the equilibrium of the fund-raising game is robust to in-
complete information.
3.2 Unobservability of the Fund-raiser Set
Our assumption regarding the observability of the the fund-raiser set is reasonable for small
fundraising campaigns. For larger ones, it is not feasible for donors to keep track of the
charitys solicitations, but to hold beliefs about them. Let Fi be donor is belief about the
fund-raiser set when she is contacted
Given the optimal fund-raiser set F 0; one natural belief system is as follows: a solicited
donor who is also in F 0 believes that the charity sticks to the solicitation strategy F 0;
whereas a solicited donor outside F o believes that every richer individual is also solicited
while lower income individuals are not:Each donor assumes that others act according to the
stated beliefs. This belief system is grounded in a learning by fund-raising setting. To gain
experience in the eld, fund-raising may be carried out by few people. Thus donors may
not perceive deviations from F o as uncorrelated or isolated mistakes. We show in the next
proposition that when donors share these beliefs, the fund-raisers equilibrium strategy is
the same whether or not it is observable.
Proposition 2 Suppose the fund-raiser set is unobservable to donors. Let Fi = F o if
i 2 F o, and Fi = f1; 2; 3; ::; ig if i =2 F o. Then, under the beliefs fFigni=1, F o is sustained
as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
It is plausible in big fund-raising campaigns that total initial donations do not cover
total initial costs. Despite that, we observe that fund-drives are launched and charitable
goods are provided out of net donations because initial donors expect the charity to continue
fund-raising up to individual k to take advantage of learning economies. Thus, they know
that eventually total donations exceed total costs.
Under the belief system described above, the fund-raiser does not necessarily have a
commitment problem to its target strategy. However, problems may arise if people perceive
mistakes to be uncorrelated as follows: If a donor in F o is contacted, he learns about the
fund-drive and believes that the rest of F o will also be contacted, whereas if a donor outside
F o is contacted, he attributes this to a mistake and believes that he is the only one contacted
besides F o.13To illustrate the tension between charity and donors under these beliefs, notice
13These beliefs are similar to passive beliefs often used in bilateral contracting in which one party
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that if k is the highest index individual being contacted under F o; any solicited individual
i > k would take otherscontributions as: G(F 0)  C(F 0)  c(k + 1): But, in fact, as the
charity keeps fund-raising more and more, subsequent cost decreases are obtained without
being noticed by additional donors. Consequently, for a big enough donor database and
learning potential, the free rider problem is curbed to some extent, thus undermining the
charitys credibility to F o:This is consistent with the anecdotal evidence that schools often
announce a target level of funds to be raised as well as the length of the fund-drive. 14
4 E¤ects of a Fixed cost on Optimal Fund-raising: Overhead
Costs vs Marginal Costs
Fixed costs, also called overhead costsexpenses such as rent, utilities, technology, account-
ing costs, legal costs, and marketing costsare an important component of a charitys cost
structure. Donors and foundations are aware of the potential detrimental impact of these
costs on the charitable good provision. Indeed, watchdog groups rank charitiese¢ ciency
based on the administrative cost to total cost ratio. For instance, Charity Navigator sug-
gests that for an acceptable charity this ratio ranges from 15% to 20%. Moreover, a study
conducted by the center of philanthropy at Indiana University shows that of the 710 foun-
dations that responded to the survey, 69% responded that their donations were intended to
support charitys overhead expenses.
To isolate the e¤ect of a xed cost on optimal fund-raising, we consider the following
particular cost structure: a xed cost s and a constant marginal cost c: This is captured
in our model by making s(1) = s > 0 and s(i) = 0 for every i > 1: Let F o(s) be the
fund-raiser set when the xed cost amounts to s:
Proposition 3 Consider two xed cost levels, s and s0 such that s < s0 and F o(s) as well
as F o(s0) are non-empty. Then,
(a) Fund-raising increases in the setup cost ,i.e, F o(s)  F o(s0)
(b) Individual gross donations augments in the setup cost, i.e, gi(F o(s)) < gi(F o(s0)) for
every i 2 F o(s0); but
privately contracts with several others (e.g., Cremer and Riordan 1987; McAfee and Schwartz 1994).
14For example, Duke University announces in 2012 a new ve-year fund-raising campaign to raise $3.25
billion for academic programs, medical education and health research, and its endowment.
15
(c) The public good amount falls in the setup cost, i.e., G(F o(s)) > G(F o(s0))
The intuition behind this Proposition is simple. From (1) it is clear that for individuals
i > 1 cuto¤ costs rise in the xed cost. Thus, given a higher xed cost, the charity solicits
more because it anticipates that individuals are more willing to give in order to partially
recover the cost increase. Despite the rise in total gross donations generated by current and
additional solicited donors, the level of the public good falls since individuals collectively
do not make up for the totality of the rise in the cost. Thus, the two positive e¤ects of the
setup cost increase, i.e., more fund-raising and more gross donations, are neutralized by the
negative e¤ect of a rising cost burden on the supplied public good.
More fund-raising, even when optimally conducted, may in some cases indicate that the
charity is actually less productive. This observation contrasts with our intuitive understand-
ing of public good provision in a costless economy where, xing individualscharacteristics,
a larger set of contributors signals a greater supply of the public good.
In the rest of the section we approach the charity´s problem of selecting a suitable
fund-raising technology to conduct fund-drives with certain characteristics. Consider a
charity deciding between two technologies with di¤erent constant marginal costs and distinct
marginal cost/overhead expenses ratios. These are described by a pair (xed cost, marginal
cost): (s; c) and (s0; c0) such that s < s0 but c > c0: Adopting the latter technology over
the former would enable the charity to save on marginal costs at the expense of a higher
overhead cost. We consider that those saving are not too high, i.e., 0 < c c0 < s0 s , thus,
selecting the most adequate cost structure is not a trivial task for the charity. It is intutive
that for small fund-drives or for charities providing public goods under strong free-riding,
technology (s; c) dominates (s0; c0) in the sense that more public good is being provided
under the former technology. In this case, since the fund-drive is small, a low overhead cost
is critical. The opposite happens in big fund-raising campaigns,where the positive impact
of a reduction on marginal costs on the public good provision is anchored. To formalize
this intuition let w = (w1; w2; :::; wn) and Li(w) =
Pi
j=1wj. Take two income vectors
w0 6= w00 such that Ln(w0) = Ln(w00). We say that w00 is more Lorenz-unequal than w0 if
Li(w
00) > Li(w0) for all i < n: Armed with this denition of Lorenz inequality,
Lemma 2 Consider an income prole w such that , n(c; s) and n(s0; c0) > 0: Then, there
exists a more Lorenz-unequal income prole w0 such that G(c; s;w0) > G(c0; s0;w0). On
the other hand, for every unequal income distribution w there exists r(w) > 0 such that
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Assumption M. U12 > 0:
Assumption M is satised for a general class of utility functions such as Cobb-Douglas.
It guarantees that in the benchmark, optimal fund-raising behaves as in the case without
commitment, i.e. it also dictates to solicit individuals in a sequence from the top to the
bottom of the income distribution. 17:Thus:
Observation 3. Individual i does not provide a gift above ti : Moreover t

i+1 > 0 implies
ti > t

i+1:
Threshold gifts leave each individual indi¤erent to contributing the "suggested" amount
or not giving at all. As in the case with purely voluntary contributions, the wealthier
the individual, the higher her threshold gift. Given the charitys commitment power to
minimum gift sizes in the benchmark, the following observation is intuitive:
Observation 4. For any xed set of donors, the voluntary provision of the public good is
below that in the benchmark.
For a xed fund-raising strategy, a lack of commitment directly hurts the public good
provision. Noteworthy, the fund-raiser can feasibly set a minimum gift size to individual i
corresponding to her voluntary contribution under F o; that is ti = gi (F
o): In other words,
the equilibrium voluntary contribution prole fgi (F o)gi2F o ; is a feasible solution to (2)
when F = F o. We then show that the fund-raiser can protably deviate. To see this,
suppose the charity exclusively pressures individual 1. By quasiconcavity of the utility
function, the fund-raiser is able to extract from him a larger gift than voluntarily provided.
In response, other individuals lower their contributions. Overall, the public good amount
increases above the level supplied under voluntary contributions, by the strict normality
assumption.
Equilibria of the fund-raising game with and without commitment can not be Pareto
ranked. This is intuitive since the fund-raiser does not act as a benevolent social plan-
ner. Even though more public good is provided in the benchmark, this may come at the
expense of some donorswelfare by setting extra-high thresholds to them. Contributors
are receiving their outside option utilities which may be below those levels in the purely
17Assumption M is satised when individuals have homothetic homothetic preferences.
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To explore the e¤ect of learning on the extent of excessive fund-raising we build on the
following sequential cost function:
s(i) = max fs  (i  1); 0g (3)
where  represents the learning rate: The next proposition shows how excessive fundraising
changes when we move from constant returns to scale in fund-raising to learning by fund-
raising.
Proposition 5 Consider two scenarios: constant returns to scale, nl = 0; and learning by
fund-raising; l 2 (0; s). Excessive fund-raising is higher under learning, l > 0:
Proposition 5 says that excessive fund-raising worsens with learning. This result can
be explained in terms of the e¤ect of learning on optimal fund-raising in both cases, when
charity commits to minimum gift size and when this is not feasible. On one hand, the
charity fund-raises more to take advantage of cost decreases when there is no commitment.
On the other hand, recall that if more than one individual is solicited in the benchmark
(under commitment), it is just out of a cost recovery motive; in other words, all individuals
are pivotal. Then, fund-raising shrinks with learning because for any subeconomy Fi, i > 1,
total cost diminishes. This implies that the fund-raising e¤ort required to reach a target
of G

(F o) in the benchmark shrinks as well. Both e¤ects push excessive fund-raising to a
higher extent.
From a policy prospective, we know that a government allocation of a grant to a charity
nanced through taxes collected in previous periods increases the level of the public good
but less than dollar by dollar. One of the reasons is that a grant displaces private giving.
In addition, Andreoni and Payne (2003, 2011) identies fund-raising crowding-out as an
important component of total crowding-out. NY(2013) formalizes fund-raising crowding
out for a costly fund-raising model with constant returns to scale in solicitations. When the
charity learns through fund-raising experience a government grant introduces an additional
benet from a societal prospective. It may decrease the extent of excessive fund-raising
through the fund-raising crowding-out channel. An additional solicitation turns out to
be marginally less protable because the free-rider problem is exacerbated, thus partially
counteracting learning benets. A similar benet can be obtained through those income
redistributions generating more inequality in a Lorenz sense that also undermine fund-
raising incentive to acquire experience by soliciting more.
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Following the logic underlying proposition 6, it seems intuitive that any increase in the
rate of learning widens excessive fund-raising. Surprisingly, this statement is not necesarily
correct.
Proposition 6 The extent of excessive fund-raising is (potentially) non-monotonic in :
Proposition 6 shows that extent excessive fund-raising is a¤ected by the rate of learning
in a complex way. This result is explained in terms of a non-monotonic propensity to
solicit an individual i > 2 in the purely voluntary contribution case, which is reected in
her cuto¤ cost being non-monotonic in the rate of learning, reaching an interior optimum.
Now, to understand the source of this non-monotonicity, note rst from (3) that there is
some threshold rate for individual i > 2, i , such that the marginal benet from learning,
s  s(i); increases in the rate of learning, ; for  < i and remains constant for   i :The
learning benet from fund-raising richer individuals lasts for a larger range of the rate
of learning, i.e., 1 > 

2:: > 

n: From these two observations, it is intuitive that for
a low learning rate the benets from accumulating more experience becomes bigger with
additional solicitations but benets drop after a certain number of solicitations for a high
learning rate. In other words, for a su¢ ciently high index individual i;she is more likely
to be a marginal net contributor for low learning rates than for high learning rates, where
learning benets from additional solicitations are exhausted quickly.
6 The learning rate and Cumulative Experience.
Even though a slower learning process may actually increase the extent of excessive fund-
raising as noted in section 5, in the upside, it may surprisingly permit the fund-raiser to
accumulate more experience as well, as formalized in the next Lemma. As in section 5, let
s(i) = max fs  (i  1); 0g . We measure cumulative experience through the marginal cost
of soliciting the last individual in the optimal set, which we denote by c(F o).
Lemma 4 Consider two rates of learning:h and l such that h > l > 0. Then c(F o(h)) 
c(F o(l)) is not always the case.
A slower learning process on one hand makes fund-raising a xed number of individuals
more costly, but on the other hand, may encourage the charity to solicit more people to
reach scale economies. If the di¤erence between learning rates is low enough, the latter e¤ect
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may outweigh the former one as stated in Lemma 3. Consequently, a charity learning more
slowly may end up accumulating more fund-raising experience reected in a lower marginal
cost. This may be important for a charity periodically running fund-drives because learning
spillovers would also be intertemporal in this case.
In summary, a slower learning process may have negative consequences in a static sense
through augmenting the extent of excessive fund-raising. This same learning process may
generate positive dynamic consequences because of deeper learning.
7 Extensions
In this section we provide three extensions. In the rst one we introduce a more realistic
framework in which donors contribute to charity based on two ulterior motives: altruism
and warm-glow. In the second one we consider the case in which population is divided
among professional groups and learning is group specic. The last one addresses decreasing
returns to scale in fund-raising in a more general way than in section 4.
7.1 Warm-Glow Giving
In this section we consider warm-glow as an additional motive for giving and show how fund-
raising incentives are a¤ected by it. As in NY(2013), we assume that an individual obtains
warm-glow from her net contribution. Thus, let u = u(xi; G; gi   c(i)) be person is utility
function, which is increasing and strictly quasi-concave. Person is demand for the public
good in a Nash equilibrium can be written as: G

= bf(wi +G i   C(F i); G i   C(F i)),
where wi = wi   c(i) and F i = F n fig. Partial derivatives satisfy 0 < bfi1 < 1 and bfi2  0
by normality of goods. If, in addition, 0 < bf1+ bf2   < 1, then a unique Nash equilibrium
obtains. Note that for bf2 = 0, the warm-glow model reduces to the standard model.
To obtain a closed form solution that facilitates our comparative statics analysis, we
consider the following utility for all i:
Ui(xi; G; gi) = (1  ) lnxi +  ln(G+ (1  )gi)
where  2 (0; 1),  =  (1 ) and  2 (; 1): Under this specication warm glow is a
substitute for altruism. The demand for the public good in this case is G

= wi +

G i:
Ignoring the costly aspect of fund-raising, note that when  = 1, G

= (wi +G i): Thus,
individuals give out of a pure public good motive. On the other hand, when  = , then
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G

= wi + G i and gi = wi: Hence, individuals give motivated by pure warm-glow.
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Thus, the lower  is, the stronger is the warm-glow motive.
It can be shown that Proposition 2 holds under this utility specication, and individual
i s cuto¤ cost is given by
ci = bwi     

iX
j=1
( bwj   bwi): (4)
It is intuitive that the more warm-glow people experience, the more incentived is the
fund-raiser to solicit more, since the free rider problem is less severe. Indeed, Eq.(4) implies
that ci increases as  decreases. Thus, fund-raisers learn more on the job when the warm-
glow motive is strong. We measure the extent of learning as cumulative experience, through
the marginal cost of soliciting the last individual in the optimal set, which, as in section 6,
we denote by c(F o). The next Lemma shows that the more intense is warm-glow, the more
experience the fund-raiser accumulates.
Lemma 5 Cumulative experiences increases in the relative intensity of warm-glow, 1  
:That is, c(F o) is decreasing in 1   in the interval (0; 1  ).
Warm-glow may incentivize the charity to invest more in learning in the following sense:
If a net free-rider is identied at some stage of the solicitation process, the fund-raiser is
more likely to solicit her as a learning investment.
7.2 Group specic learning
Suppose the fund-raiser divides the set of potential donors into m  1 groups, depending
on their professional activities. She believes that each member of group i independently
draws his income from a discrete distribution, ewi, with mean E[ ewi]. We assume that the
charity learns by fund-raising within a group, but this experience does not translate into
cost decreases in soliciting members of other groups:Thus, let si(j) be the sequential cost
of fund-raising the jth individual in group i. The fund-raisers strategy is to choose the
number of donors to be contacted from each group. To focus the analysis on the fund-raiser
side, we continue to assume that donors have no uncertainty about the income prole in the
population. Moreover, to simplify the analysis, we consider identical homothetic preferences
20The parameter  represents the altruism coe¢ cient as introduced in Andreoni (1989). It is a measure
of the relative strength of the public good motive for giving.
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so that f(w) = w for some  2 (0; 1). Without loss of generality we rank groups according
to their average disposable incomes: E[ ew1]   as1  :::  E[ ewm]   asm . The fund-raisers
equilibrium strategy is stated in Proposition 9.
Proposition 7 Let group i s cuto¤ be given by
ci = E[ ewi]  asi   1   Pij=1 nj (E[ ewj ]  E[ ewi]) + (asi   asj )
Then c1  c2  :::  cn. Moreover, every member of group i is solicited i¤ c < ci
The fund-raiser optimally treats each group member as having mean disposable income
E[ ewi]   asi :It is intuitive, then, that the fund-raiser either contacts no members of group
i i¤ c  ci or solicits all of them i¤ c < ci: Thus, group is cuto¤ cost is interpreted as
the average propensity of its members to pay for c: Note that an increase in the extent of
learning economies within a group i; either due to the presence of more members or to a
higher speed of learning, augments the groups mean disposable income. Thus, group i is
more likely to be solicited and any other group less so.
We say that groups i and j merge if the fund-raiser knows ni and nj but is not able to
distinguish among members of these groups. (NY, 2013)
Consider the case in which the technology for fund-raising any given group is s(j) and
two groups merge. We assume full learning spillovers within the merged group. That is, the
fund-raising cost function for this group is still s(j): One may think that since the merger
brings more potential for learning, the public good provision increases. But this is not
always the case. After a merger, available information becomes coarser in the sense that
the fund-raiser does not distinguish individuals in the merged group. This e¤ect potentially
hurts the public good provision as shown in the next Lemma:
Lemma 6 Suppose groups i is solicited and group j is not and they merge. If the merged
group ij is not solicited, i.e.,
E[ ewij ]  asij   1   Pfk 6=i;j:E[ ewk]>E[ ewij ]gnk

(E[ ewk]  E[ ewik]) + (ask   asij )  c;
where E[ ewij ] and asij are respectively the mean income and average cost of the merged group
ij; then the ex-ante public good provision after the merger diminishes
Lemma 6 makes explicit the tradeo¤ generated after a merger. On one hand, learning
increases, i.e., asij < asi ; which makes cij increase with respect to ci: On the other hand,
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coarser information hurts fund-raising in the sense that E[ ewij ] < E[ ewi]: This e¤ect makes
cij fall below ci: If the latter e¤ect is stronger, the merged group ij is not solicited. Thus,
members of group i; who were optimally solicited before the merger, are no longer identied
by the fund-raiser, learning spillovers do not justify the inclusion of members of the merger
group in the solicitation set. As a result, the public good provision declines.
It has been documented that a commercial rm may experience a depreciation in cumu-
lative experience through time, for example by introducing new products or dealing with
unexpected technology shocks. Benkard (2000) models organizational forgetting for the
aircarft industry and tested that hypothesis empirically. In our setting, we may introduce
incomplete learning spillovers in fund-raising when two groups i and j merge. For exam-
ple, consider the following modication to the technology described above: whenever the
kth individual being solicited pertains to one group and the k + 1 th individual results
to belongs to the other group, the experience gained from fund-raising the kth individ-
ual vanishes. Let easij be the ramdom variable representing the average cost of group ij.
Note that E(easij ) > asij : Moreover, there are particular realizations of easij higher than
max

asi ; asj
	
:In these cases, fund-raising the merge group turns out to be more costly
on average, than soliciting all members of any of the groups before they become indistin-
guishable. This is an illustration of how ex-post public good provision may diminish in the
presence of fund-raising forgetting, even when coarser information is not detrimental, as in
the case whenever both groups i and j are fund-raised before the merge. If the intensity
of forgetting is strong enough, the e¤ect on public good provision may be detrimental even
from an ex-ante prospective.
Lemma 7 Suppose that optimal fund-raising entails soliciting groups i and j before they
merge. Consider a forgetting process such that E(easij ) > niE(ai)+njE(aj)ni+nj : Then, the ex-ante
public good provision after the merger diminishes.
Previous works, such as Andreoni (2013), nd a negative e¤ect of diversity on the public
good provision. Its analysis comes from the donors side. The previous discussion suggests
that a better understanding of this matter must include as well a complementary analysis
from the fund-raiser side. Augmenting the diversity of a group, say trough a merge, even
controlling for the negative e¤ect of coarser information on optimal fund-raising, may be
detrimental for the public good provision due to negative learning spillovers (forgetting).
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7.3 Decreasing returns to scale
In this section we consider a charity constrained by physical and human resources. We
envision fund-raising as an increasingly costly process. The next proposition formalizes the
fund-raisers solicitation strategy in this setting.
Proposition 8 Suppose s(1)  s(2)  s(3)::  s(n): Let (G)  (G) G, and donor is
cost cuto¤ be given by
ci( bwi) = bwi   (Pi 1j=1( bwj   bwi) (cuto¤ costs)
Then, c1  c2  :::  cn, and F o = fi 2 N jc < cig
A technology with decreasing returns to scale reinforce the free-rider problem thus mak-
ing the charity even more conservative in soliciting an additional subject, with respect to
the constant marginal cost setting . Furthermore, absent a learning motive, once a net
free rider is identied, the solicitation process stops. Consequently, as in NY (2013), every
solicited individual is a net contributor in F o: Indeed, it is intuitive that as the charity
experiences more rapid diseconomies of scale, the fund-raiser set shrinks together with the
public good provision. Moreover, the degree of excessive fund-raising tends to diminish in
a setting where donors have a low taste for the public good.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we extend the literature on charitable fund-raising by bringing to the center of
the analysis the role of solicitation technology in optimal fund-raising. It is characterized in
terms of donorspreference and incomes as well as solicitation costs. We also develop a no-
tion of excessive fund-raising within a single charity framework with respect to a benchmark
in which the fund-raiser commits to minimum gift sizes.
We specially consider a charity which becomes a more e¢ cient fund-raiser with each
additional solicitation. This fact is not innocuous in terms of optimal fund-raising and ex-
cessive fund-raising. On the contrary, on one hand, it determines an investment in learning
incentive. For instance, some charities may launch a fund-drive even when initial donations
are not su¢ cient to cover initial costs. However, it is common knowledge that the charity
fund-raises more to achieve cost reductions, which ensures the charitable good provision.
Consequently, measures of e¢ ciency based on average quantities such as cost to donation
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ratios may severely underestimate the prospects of learning in interim fund-raising cam-
paigns. On the other hand, the extent of excessive fund-raising augments when we move
from a constant return to scale technology to a situation of learning through fund-raising
experience.
From a policy perspective, the introduction of direct government grants have relevant
e¤ects in environments where the fund-raiser learns on the job. In a static sense, it
alleviates excessive fund-raising by accelerating free-riding. As a consequence, the charity
accumulates less experience, which may be detrimental for the public good provision in a
dynamic sense. Thus, government grants may be more benecial for occasional fund-drives
with considerable learning potential.
In big fund-drives, since donors are unable to keep track of solicitations to others, they
form beliefs about those. We show that in some cases, a strong charity learning potential
may undermine its commitment to its optimal fund-raising strategy. As a result, initial
donors may be cautious in the size of their donations conjecturing that the charity will
solicit too much. This observation is related to the common practice of charities to set soft
fund-raising targets in terms of money and time. The fulllment of those targets generates
credibility for future campaigns.
We further consider an extension of the model incorporating warm-glow. Charities in
sectors where donors experience strong warm-glow invest more in learning and accumulate
more experience. Considering a framework where charities endogeneously choose a fund-
raising techonology, it is more likely to observe returns to scale to solicitations in those
causes related to intense warm-glow motives.
In another extension we characterize optimal fund-raising in a setting in which the
population is divided among professional groups and learning takes place exclusively within
each group. We nd that increasing the diversity within groups by merging those may be
detrimental for the public good provision due to negative learning spillovers.
For future research, it may be worthile to characterize optimal fund-raising when there
are several charities competing with horizontally di¤erentiated causes, as in Andreoni and
Payne 2001.
Appendix
Proof of Observation 1. Suppose the optimal strategy consists in fundraising k
individuals: Let Cj =
P
ij c(i):Consider the case in which the rst i individuals are
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included in the set, where i < k. Denote G(F+l) = G(F [ flg) Note that by including
any individual l  i such that gl (F+l) > 0; by (??), it follows that every individual j  i is
also a contributor. Moreover,G(F+l)  C solves
(i+ 1) [(G(F+l)  Ci+1)  (G(F+l)  Ci+1)] +G(F+l)  Ci+1 =Pi
j=1wi + wl   Ci+1
Thus, G(F+(i+1))  G(F+l) for any k  l  i + 1, since wi+1  wl and 0 > 0: The
proposition follows from applying iteratively the previous result.
Denition. Let G0i (c) be the drop-out level of the public good for person i under net
income wi   c, which uniquely solves f(wi   c + G0i ) = G0i . By convention G0i (c) = 0
whenever wi   c  0:
Lemma A1. If G(Fi) > 0 for some Fi, then gi (Fi) c(i) > 0 if and only if G0i (c(i)) >
G

(Fi)
Proof. Following closely Lemma 1 in NY(2013), note that i(G

(Fi))   G (Fi) =
wi  gi (F ), or equivalently i(G

(Fi)) G (Fi) = (wi  c(i))  (gi (Fi)  c(i)) if gi (Fi) > 0;
and i(G

(Fi)) G (Fi)  wi if gi (Fi) = 0. Since i(G0i (c(i))) G0i (c(i)) = wi   c(i), and
0i > 1, the Lemma follows.
Denition. Let i(G) 
Pi
j=1((G)   G) + G, where   f 1 and 0i(G) > 0: Dene
i(c(i))  i(G0i (c(i))) 
Pi
j=1(wj   c(j))
Corollary 1 If G(Fi) > 0 for some Fi, then gi (Fi)  c(i) > 0 if and only if i(c(i)) > 0:
Proof of Lemma 1. This proof follows closely NY(2013). Dene ci the value of c
making i(c(i)) = 0. Simplifying terms, ci solves:
i[(G0i (c(i))) G0i (c(i))] +G0i (c(i)) 
Pi
j=1(wj   s(j)) + ic = 0:
Since (G0i (c(i))) G0i (c(i)) = wi   s(i)  c; from the equation above, we have
G0i (ci + s(i)) =
iX
j=1
[(wj   wi) + (s(i)  s(j))] :
In addition, given that (G)  (G) G, we also have (G0i (ci+s(i))) = wi s(i) ci =

Pi
j=1 [(wj   wi) + (s(i)  s(j))]

, which reduces to
ci = wi   s(i)  (
Pi
j=1 [(wj   wi) + (s(i)  s(j))]):
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Let bwi = wi  s(i). Then ci = bwi (Pij=1( bwj   bwi)): Finally, notice that i > 0 i¤ c < ci;
then, by the previous corollary, the proposition follows.
Proof of Proposition 1. By noting that if G(Fi) > 0 then it satises i(G

(Fi)) =Pi
j=1(wj   c(j)) and by Lemma A1, it follows that i(wi   c(i)) > 0 i¤ gi (Fi)   c(i) >
0. Consider rst the case where i = 1: Take the lowest index indvidual k  i s.t. (i)
k(wk c(k)) > 0 and (ii)
Pk
j=1(wj c(j)) > 0: Clearly G

(Fk) > G
0
k(c(k)) > 0 = G

(f;g):
Now consider i > 1 and individuals 1; 2; ::; i 1 are solicited. Take the lowest index indvidual
k  i s.t. k(wk   c(k)) > 0 Notice that gk(Fk) > 0: Thus,G

(Fk) > 0. It also follows
that i 1(G

(Fk)) =
Pi 1
j=1(wj   c(j)) +
Pk
j=i
h
gj (Fk)  c(j)
i
. Thus, G

(Fk) > G

(Fi 1)
i¤
Pk
j=i
h
gj (Fk)  c(j)
i
> 0: Let w
0
j   c0(j) = wj   c(j) for j < i and w0j   c
0
(j) = aw c(ik)
for i  j  k: This implies i(w0i   c0(i)) = i+1(w0i+1   c0(i + 1)) = :: = k(w0k   c0(k)).
Thus gj (w
0
j ; Fk)  c0(j) > 0 for every j = i; i+ 1; ::; k:i¤i(aw c(ik)) > 0. Note also that
Pk
j=i

gj (w
0
j ; Fk)  c0(j)

=
kX
j=i
aw c(ik) +
i 1X
j=1
(wi   c(i))
 Pi 1j=1 gj (w0j ; Fk)  c0(j)
=
kX
j=1
(wi   c(i)) 
Pi 1
j=1

gj (wj ; Fk)  c(j)

=
Pk
j=i

gj (wj ; Fk)  c(j)

The rst equality above is valid since individuals i; i+ 1; ::; k are gross contributors, under
both income distributions. Thus, we obtain the result
G

(Fk) > G

(Fi 1) i¤
Pk
j=i

gj (Fk)  c(j)

> 0 i¤i(aw c(ik)) > 0:
Consider the case in which k > i: Suppose there is no i  l < k such that l(aw c(ik)) > 0:
In this case it is optimal to include i; i + 1; ::; k in F o: Thus, by Lemma 1 the proposition
follows.
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) follows by noticing that cost cuto¤ for individuals i > 1
are increasing in the setup cost and the fund-drive is launched for both xed cost levels
under consideration. To prove (ii) by Let F o(s)(G) 
P
i2F o(s)((G)   G) + G and k be
the number of solicitations under F o(s0): Then, by using equilibrium conditions
F o(s0)(G

) =
P
i2F o(s0)(wi   c)  s
>
P
F o(s0)(wi   c)  s0 = F o(s0)(G

(F o(s0)))
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The inequality comes from s < s0: By strict normality, 0F o(s)(:) > 0:Thus, G

> G

(F o(s0):
Note that G
  G(F o(s)), by a revealed preference argument. Thus, G(F o(s)) >
G

(F o(s0)):Finally, note that in equilibrium gi (F
o(s0)) = wi + G

(F o(s0))   i(F o(s0)).
Since G

(F o(s)) > G

(F o(s0)) and 0i > 1, it follows that gi (F
o(s0)) > gi (F
o(s)) for every
i 2 F o(s0). Thus, (iii) follows.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let Fi be donor is belief about the fund-raiser set when he
is contacted. Then, as stated in the text, Fi = F o if i 2 F o, and Fi = f1; 2; 3; ::; ig if i =2 F o.
We will show that given the beliefs fFigni=1, contacting j =2 F o is not a protable deviation
for the fund-raiser. Let k be the lowest index individual being solicited under F o:Let goj be
js contribution under the stated belief system. We rst show that
Pj
i=k+1 [g
o
i   c(i)]  0
for any j  k + 1: By contradiction, suppose Pji=k+1 [goi   c(i)] > 0 for some j =2 F o.
Then, there must be some k + 1  l  j such that gol > gl (Fj) since by proposition 2Pj
i=k+1 [g

i (Fi)  c(i)]  0: Pick that individual. Then:
(G

(F o) +
Pj
i=k+1 [g
o
i   c(i)])  (G(F o) +
Pj
i=k+1 [g
o
i   c(i)]) = wl   gol . (5)
On the other hand, if the individuals in Fj knew about the presence of the other ones before
contributing, then,
(G

(Fj)) G(Fj)  wl   gl (Fj). (6)
Now, gol > g

l (Fj) implies wl   gl (Fj) > wl   gol . Then, since 0 > 1, eq.(5) and (6)
reveal that G

(Fj) > G

(F o) +
Pj
i=k+1 [g
o
i   c(i)]. This contradicts G

(Fj)  G(F o).
Lemma A2. Suppose G01 > G
0
2 > ::: > G
0
n > 0. Then
(a) there are some replicas rn  :::  r2 < 1 such that type-i donors are not solicited in
any r  ri replica economy.
(b) As r !1, only type-1 donors are solicited, in which case each donation converges to
the solicitation cost, c1, but the public good level approaches to G01.
Proof. We rst claim that if G(F ) > 0 for some F , then i 2 F is a net contributor
in equilibrium, i.e., gi (F )   ci > 0 if and only if G0i > G

(F ). As we argued in the
above proof, in a positive equilibrium, i(G

(F ))   G (F ) = wi   gi (F ), or equivalently
i(G

(F )) G (F ) = (wi   ci)  (gi (F )  ci) if gi (F ) > 0; and i(G

(F )) G (F )  wi
if gi (F ) = 0. Since i(G
0
i ) G0i = wi   ci by the denition of drop-out value, and 0i > 1,
the claim follows.
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Now, note that since i+1(G
0
i+1) G0i+1 = wi+1   ci+1, we have
i  i+1 = G0i  G0i+1 +
iX
j=1
[(j(G
0
i ) G0i )  (j(G0i+1) G0i+1)]:
Given that G0i  G0i+1 and 0j > 1, it follows that i  i+1. Moreover, 1 = G01 > 0.
Next, let k 2 N be the largest number such that k > 0. Since k(0) = 0, 0k > 0,
and
Pk
j=1(wj   cj) > 0, there is a unique solution, G

> 0, to k(G

) =
Pk
j=1(wj   cj).
If this is an equilibrium, each i = 1; :::; k is a net contributor because G0i > G

. G

is an
equilibrium among these individuals if
Pk
j=1 cj  G i < bCi for i = 1; :::; k. Note that
kX
j=1
cj  G i 
kX
j=1
cj  
kX
j 6=i
cj = ci:
But, by Assumption S, ci < bCi. Finally, Lemma A1 implies that G =  1k (Pkj=1(wj cj)).

Proof of Lemma 2. Let w01 =
Xn
i=1
wi   n and w0i =  for i > 1 and  close
to cero. Then, F o(w0) = f1g under any of the proposed cost distributions: Since c(1) =
s + c < c0(1) = s0 + c0: Then, G(c; s;w0) > G(c0; s0;w0): Now by Lemma A1, there exists
r(c; s;w); r(c0; s0;w) > 0 such that every individual of type 1,i.e., richest individuals, are
solicited in both cases. Take r = max fr(c; s;w); r(c0; s0;w)g :Then, for r > r the fund-raiser
set is identical under either cost distribution. It just entails soliciting the richest income
individuals (type-1-individuals). Then, for r big enough jF o(r)j (c   c0) > s0   s which
implies G

(c; s;w) < G

(c0; s0;w) since both quantities are bounded, by Lemma A2 and the
strict normality assumption.
Denition. Let ti(T i) be the value of ti satisfying U(wi   ti(T i); ti(T i) + T i)  
U(wi; T i) = 0
Denote G0i (0) simply as G
0
i ; i.e., f(wi +G
0
i ) = G
0
i :
Let tsi be individual i threshold gift in a solo economy, i.e., t
s
i satises U(wi   tsi ; tsi ) =
U(wi; 0);
Dene individual i s threshold gift as a function of othersthreshold gifts as
ti(T i) = bT (wi + T i; T i; wi)  T i; (7)
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Lemma A3. bT satises:
1 bT (wi + T i; T i; wi)  T i > 0 for every T i 2 0; G0i 
2 bT (wi +G0i ; G0i ; wi) G0i = 0
3 bT1 > 0; bT2 < 0; bT3 < 0
4 bT (wi + T i; T i; wi) > f(wi + T i) for every T i 2 0; G0i 
5 bT1 + bT3 > 0
Proof. Note that by quasiconcavity and by assumption M we respectively know that
(i) Uii < 0 and U12 > 0 Moreover, by denition of gi(T i) it follows that (ii) U1(wi  
gi(T i); gi(T i)+T i) = U2(wi  gi(T i); gi(T i)+T i). Quasiconcavity of the utility func-
tion also implies that (iii) ti(T i) > gi(T i): Therefore, (iv) U1(wi ti(T i); ti(T i)+T i) >
U2(wi Ti(T i); Ti(T i)+T i) by (i), (ii) and (iii). By di¤erentiating U(wi ti(T i); ti(T i)+
T i)   U(wi; T i) = 0 wrt T i we obtain @tidT i =
U2(wi;T i) U2(wi ti;T i+ti)
U2(wi ti;T i+ti) U1(wi ti;T i+ti) : The sign
of @tidT i is negative by (i) and (iv). After adding T i to each side of individual i s bud-
get constraint we obtain xi + T = wi + T i, then as in the standard public good model
(BBV), the rst term of bT captures the direct positive e¤ect of wi + T i on T . The sec-
ond term of bT captures the negative e¤ect of T i on T through a better outside option.
The third term captures the negative e¤ect of wi on T through a better outside option.
Thus, (3) follows. Part (4) also follows by quasiconcavity. By quasiconcavity of the utility
function, tsi > 0: Moreover t
s
i =
bT (wi; 0; wi) > f(wi) = gsi : Note that by denition of G0i ;
U(wi; G
0
i ) > U(wi   gi; G0i + gi) for any gi > 0: Thus, bT (wi + T i; T i; wi)   T i > 0 for
every T i 2

0; G0i

and bT (wi +G0i ; G0i ; wi) G0i = 0
Finally to obtain (5) we di¤erentiate U(wi  ti(T i); ti(T i)+T i) U(wi; T i) = 0 wrt
wi. Thus, @tidwi =
U1(wi;T i) U1(wi ti;T i+ti)
U2(wi ti;T i+ti) U1(wi ti;T i+ti) : The sign of
@ti
dwi
is positive by (i) and (iv).
For the following lemmas and propositions we omit the third argument of bT ;knowing
that bT is increasing in wi, by Lemma A3, part (5)
Lemma A4. In the costless case, there exists a solution to the taxation problem unique
up to total taxation T . Moreover, if bT1 + bT2 < 0 the optimal solution consists of at
most one individual threshold gift to be positive
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Proof. Fixing a set F; existence follows directly from Browers xed point. For the
case in which bT1 + bT2 < 0 note that @tidT i <  1, thus it directly follows that the optimal
solution entails taxing just one individual.
Lemma A5. Suppose that under costless fund-raising, dtidT i <  1; then, facing a total
cost C; individual 1 is the only one being solicited if C  ts1 G02 . More individuals
are contacted i¤ C > ts1 G02 (but without being too big to totally discourages giving).
In this latter case, solicited donors beyond individual 1 partially recover the cost, i.e.,P
i>1 t

i < C: Moreover every donor is pivotal, i.e.,
dti
dT  i
> 0 for every i s.t. ti > 0
Proof. Note that bT1 + bT3 > 0 implies that stand-alone gifts are ranked according to
incomes. Consequently, if the optimal solicitation strategy dictates to contact just a single
individual, this must be individual 1. Dene tsi as individual i s standalone value. Consider
rst the case in which C  ts1 G02: It means that ti = 0 for any i > 1: Thus, just individual
1 is solicited in this case. Now, consider the case in which C > ts1   G02 . It implies that
t2(t
s
1   C) > 0: Therefore, at least one more individual is solicited. Suppose
P
i>1 t

i = C:
From individual 1 prospective the economy is costless. Therefore, t1 > G01 because
dti
dT i <
 1.Then, it also follows that t1 > G0i for i > 1. This contradicts ti > 0 for i > 1: SupposeP
i>1 t

i > C , then by implementing t

2    instead of t2, the fund-raiser would be able to
increase individual 1 threshold gift by more than  > 0 since dtidT i <  1. This contradicts
the optimallity of fti gi2F  :To consider the last part of the lemma we adapt the denition of
t1 for costly fund-raising: t1 C = bT (w1+T 1 C;max fT 1   C; 0g) max fT 1   C; 0g :
Hence,
P
i>1 t

i < C implies t
0
1 (T i) = bT1 > 0: More generally, consider the case in which
the fund-raiser optimally solicits at least two individuals. Pick individuals i and j . We
show that it must be the case that t0i ; t
0
j > 0: That is, all individuals are pivotal. By way
of contradiction, suppose it does not follow. Let t0i < 0; i:e:; T i   C > 0 for some i; then
by reducing j0s gift size by one unit, the fund-raiser is enable to rise individual i0s threshold
gift by more than one unit, which constitutes a protable deviation. Contradiction.
Proof Observation 3. Consider rst the case in which dtidT i >  1 for C = 0;i.e.,
0 < bT1 + bT2 < 1: We show that ti > ti+1 whenever wi > wi+1 : By way of contradiction
suppose ti+1 > t

i : Note that there exists an inverse function b(T ;wi); where T = T   C
such that b1 > 0 and b2 < 0 and
ti = T
  b(T ; wi) < ti+1 = T   b(T ; wi+1): Since b2 < 0; it implies wi < wi+1 which
is a contradiction. Now consider dtidT i <  1 when C = 0;i.e., bT1+ bT2 < 0:We provide a local
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argument to show the result. Clearly individual 1 is solicited since she is the one providing
the greatest stand-alone value. If two or more solicitations are made t0i > 0 for every i s.t.
ti > 0 by Lemma A4. Therefore, bT1+ bT2 = bT1 > 0. Thus, at T = T ;there exists an inverse
function (wi) such that 
0
< 0 and
ti = T
   (wi) < ti+1 = T
   (wi+1): Since 0 < 0; it implies wi < wi+1 which is a
contradiction.
Finally, to prove the last part of the observation, consider some individual providing a
gift yi > t

i : Then U(xi  yi ; yi +T  i C) > U(wi;max

T  i   C; 0
	
): This means that the
threshold gift is set below individual i best response to T  i C: By quasiconcavity of the util-
ity function there exists t0i > y

i such that U(xi  t0i; t0i+T  i C) = U(wi;max

T  i   C; 0
	
);
which contradicts the optimality of fti gi2F  :
Proof Observation 4. The voluntary contributions fgi g
jF ij
i=1 is a feasible solution
to (2) . Pick individual 1. Note that since g1 is her best response to G 1   C then
U(w1   g1; g1 + G 1   C) > U(w1; G 1   C) . Therefore, by quasiconcavity of U() it
follows that g1 < t1(G 1): Hence, by xing t1(G 1) we obtain G < t1(G 1) +G 1(t1);by
strict normality. Since G 1(t1) < G 1 then U(w1   t1(G 1); t1(G 1) + G 1   C) =
U(w1; G
 1 C) > U(w1; G 1(t1(G 1)) C): Thus,

t1(G
 1); G 1(t1)
	
is a feasible solution
to (2). We have found a protable deviation from G from the fund-raisers prospective.
Thus, G < T :
Proof of Proposition 4.. This Lemma follows directly from observation 4.
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose at least two individuals are solicited in the voluntary
contribution model. We know from Lemma A4, that in this case every individual is pivotal,
i:e:, dtidT i > 0:This means that T

 i   C < 0 for every i 2 F . For the next step, x
F :By quasiconcavity of the utility function we know that ts1 > gs1: Consider T  i > G

 i for
individual i:It follows that ti(T  i) > ti(G

 i) > gi(G

 i): The rst inequality comes from the
pivotality condition T  i C < 0; that is own gifts and gifts by other are complementary, as
well as from T  i(F
) > G i(F
):The second inequality comes from the quasiconcavity of
the utility function. Thus ti (F
) > gi (F
) for every i 2 F : To conclude the proof we show
that i 2 F  implies i 2 F o: Note that i 2 F  implies G i(F ) C i < T  i(F ) C i < c(i):
The former inequality follows because G i < T

 i: This allows us to conclude that individual
i is not a free rider since no public good would be provided in F  without her contribution.
By assumption S either F  = F o and by proposition 1, gi (F
) > c(i) or F   F o.
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Lemma A6. (Voluntary contributions) For every i > 2 :ci( = 0) < ci( = s): Moreover,
for any: 00 > 0 (i)ci(0) < ci(00) for 0  0; 00 < si 1 and (ii) ci(0)  ci(00) for
s
i 1 < 
0; 00  s
Proof. Note that
ci(s) = wi   (
Pi 1
j=1 [(wj   wi)  s] > ci(0)
= wi   s  (
Pi 1
j=1 [(wj   wi)] ;
establishing the rst part of the Lemma. Moreover,
ci() = wi   s+ (i  1)  (
Pi 1
j=1

(wj   wi)  (i  1) i
2

for 0   < si 1 . Thus, @ci()d = i   1 + 0(:)(i   1) i2 > 0: On the other hand for
s
i 1    s; note that c() = wi   (
Pi 1
j=1 [(wj   wi) + (max f(i  1); sg   s] : Thus,
@ci()
d =  0(:)
h
(k 1)k
2
i
< 0 where k is the highest index individual with (k   1) < s:
Lemma A7. For any 1; 2 such that 1 < 2 it must follow that F (2)  F (1)
Proof. Consider rst the benchmark with constant marginal cost. Note that if t1(0) 
c s  G02, then, it follows that the optimal fund-raising strategy in the benchmark consists
in soliciting exclusively individual 1. Moreover, this strategy is xed for any learning rate.
On the other hand, consider jF j  2: By Lemma A5 we know that if an individual i  2
is solicited, then she must be pivotal.
Note that an increase in  lowers C(F ): Therefore, if individual i > jF j was not
necessary to cover C(F ) before the  increase, it would not be contacted once  increases.
Thus, for any 1; 2 such that 1 < 2 it must follow that F (2)  F (1)
Proof of Proposition 5. Consider the voluntary case:By Lemma A5, :ci(0) <
ci() for any 0 <   si 1 :Thus, (i) F o(0)  F o(): From Lemma A7, we know that
F ()  F o(0):Since n(G(F o()))  jF ()j  jF o(0)j and by (i) the proposition folllows.
Proof of Proposition 6. We rst show that fund-raising in the pure voluntary
contribution case is potentially non-monotonic in : Consider jN j > 2: Let i be the highest
index in the set. Fix w1; w2; :; wi 1 such that; (i)wj  wj+1 + s for every j = 1; 2; ::; i  
1; i:e:; cuto¤ costs are monotonically decreasing, (ii) c < ci 1(0);i.e., every j < i is a net
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contributor for any 0    s , Note that there exists wi > 0 such that ci(wi ; s) = c,
or, equivalently wi   s   (
Pi 1
j=1(wj   wi)   s) = 0:This comes from ci(wi 1 ; s) > c,
@ci(w ;s)
dw = 1 + 
0
(i   1). On the other hand, let wi > 0 solves c(wi; s(i 1)) = c.That is,
wi   s   (
Pi 1
j=1

(wj   wi)  i2s

) > 0:Since ci(:) is increasing in i;it follows that wi >
wi:Moreover, wi 1 > wi: Pick any wi  wi > wi: Then:
ci(0) < ci(s)  c < ci( s
i  1) (8)
Thus, given that every j < i is in F 0 for any ;by (ii) and from (8) it follows that
F o(0) = F o(s)  F o( si 1).
By this result, Lemma A7, and the fact that n(G(F o()))  jF ()j ;it follows then
that excessive fund-raising is potentially non- monotonic in :
Proof of Lemma 4. A particular example works. Consider N = f1; 2; 3g : Suppose
w1 > w2 + c and w2 > w3 +c:Let w3 solves c(w3 ; c  cl) = c: That is,
w3 = (
P2
j=1 [(wj   w3)  (c  cl)]):
Let w3 solves c(w3;
c cl
2 ) = c: That is,
w3 = (
P2
j=1

(wj   wi) 
3
2
(c  cl)

)
Check that w1 and w2 are big enough such that w3 > 0: Pick any w3  w3 > w3:
Then, c3(w3; 0) < c3(w3; c   cl)  c < c3(w3; c cl2 ): Now, let  solves c3(w3; ) = c:
Let h =  + ; l = : So, F o( = h) = f1; 2g and F o( = l) = f1; 2; 3g : Then,
c(2; h)  c(3; l) = h   2 > 0 since h > c cl2 :
Proof of Proposition 7. In NY(2013) it is proven that without learning, either
all members of a given group are solicited or neither of them are. Once we introduce
learning, this result is reinforced in the sense that being j a member of group i, then
E[ ewi]  s(j) < E[ ewi]  s(j + 1):
Thus, the cuto¤ cost of individual j+1 is higher than the cuto¤ cost of individual j:By
following the corollary of proposition 2, it, then, also follows that either all members of
a given group are solicited or neither of them are. Therefore, we can redistribute income
among members of group i such that each of them is allocated with mean income E[ ewi] asi :
As in the proof of proposition 2, such a redistribution is neutral. Thus, the result follows
by applying proposition A1 in NY (2012).
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Proof of Lemma 6. Notice that if group ij is not solicited, then no additional
learning is generated by the fund-raiser strategy. On the other hand, since group i was
solicited before the merger, a revealed preference argument shows that a strictly lower
public good provision is expected after the merger.
Proof of Proposition 8. Notice that under decreasing returns to scale, the cost
function is non-decreasing. Therefore, f bwig is a non-increasing sequence. From (1) the
result follows.
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